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Abstract  
Although significant scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of 
mosque conflicts in Europe, up until now most of it has focussed on Western 
European countries. This has left a significant gap to be filled in the study of 
mosque tensions in Central and Eastern Europe, where scholarship is scant yet 
where tensions over constructions of mosques are not less intensive than in the 
West. Drawing on two recent case studies of mosque constructions in Poland, 
we argue that a significant shift has taken place in the ways that mosques are 
perceived, unveiling unprecedented opposition towards their construction. 
From being largely unproblematic before the Second World War and during 
the Communist era, mosques have become subjects of fierce public debate. We 
draw parallels to how anti-mosque arguments raised in Poland fit into a larger 
European meta-narrative on mosques and Muslims, yet our aim is to situate the 
paper historically to argue that Polish mosque conflicts must be contextualised 
ZLWKLQ 3RODQG¶V XQLTXe historical encounter with Islam in order to more 
accurately make sense of its creeping Islamophobia.  
Keywords: Mosques, Muslims, Poland, Islamophobia, Post-dependence 
theory, Post-colonial theory 
Introduction  
Islam in Europe has gained an increasingly public profile over the last decades. 
This has been linked not only to the demographic growth of European Muslim 
communities and the multifaceted processes of their adaptation to changing 
social, economic and political conditions, but also to external factors such as 
IRU H[DPSOH WKH ,UDQLDQ 5HYROXWLRQ  DQG PRUH UHFHQWO\ WKH µ:DU RQ
7HUURU¶7KHWHUURULVWDWWDFNVFDUULHGRXWLQ(XURSHERWKE\VRFDOOHG,VODPLVWV
as well as Islamophobes - most notably in Spain in 2004, Britain in 2005, 
Norway in 2011 and Paris in 2015 - have also contributed to the politicisation 
of Islam on the continent. Correspondingly, there has been a growing body of 
scholarship focusing on Muslims in Europe and their relations with non-
Muslims, including tensions and conflicts between them (Dassetto and Rallet 
2010, Bektovic 2012). Mosque building projects are an important site at which 
some of these conflicts emerge, and increased scholarly attention has been 
given to this issue in the last decade (Kong 2010).  
The vast body of literature devoted to this subject has, however, almost 
solely centred on Western European geographies (Gilliat-Ray and Birt 2010, 
*DOHDQG1D\ORU6FKPLWWQRW OHDVW LQ WKLV MRXUQDO¶VVSHFLDO LVVXH
on mosque conflicts in Europe (Cesari 2005). With a few exceptions 
(Nalborczyk 2011, Melicharek 2009, Chudzikova & Naglova 2011) there has 
been little engagement with the topic in the region of Central and Eastern 
Europe (herafter CEE),Q$OOLHYL¶VH[WHQVLYHSXEOLFDWLRQµ0RVTXHVLQ
(XURSH¶(XURSH¶VFHQWUDOUHJLRQLVDJDLQRYHUORRNHG 
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This paper aims to start filling the gap that we identify in existing 
research by exploring conflicts around mosque construction projects in Poland. 
We contextualise mosque conflicts through an historical lens, one that is 
sensitive to the significant IslaPLFKLVWRU\RI3RODQGDVZHOODV WKHFRXQWU\¶V
recent Communist past. In so doing, we propose to enlarge the conceptual as 
well as empirical lenses through which mosque conflicts in CEE are assessed. 
By situating this paper in theoretical frameworks that astutely critique the 
epistemic dominance of Western narratives, we want to write against what we 
observe to be a tradition of subordination of those European narratives that fall 
outside of dominant Western knowledges. As such, events occurring in the 
CEE region are either entirely ignored, or understood as merely reproducing 
earlier developments in Western Europe. While appreciating that pan-
European mosque conflicts influence the Polish setting and, what is more, that 
Islamophobic attitudes circulate between national contexts, not least with 
increased migration flows (see Gawlewicz and Narkowicz 2015), we hope to 
give justice to the local context and more accurately assess an unprecedented 
growth of public expressions of Islamophobia in Poland. 
This paper is inspired by post-dependence theory that draws from 
postcolonial theoretical insights and applies these to post-communist 
geographies. Postcolonial theory has enabled for an alternative way of thinking 
around modernity, giving space for critical engagement with Otherness. It has 
primarily focused the analytical lens on power relationships between 
(ex)colonies and Western imperial states (Tlostanova 2012). The geographical 
VSDFH RI WKH µVHFRQG ZRUOG¶ RU DV 7ORVWDQRYD FDOOV LW µD VWUD\ RXWJURZWK RI
western PRGHUQLW\¶KDVQRWEHHQUHDGLO\LQFOXGHGLQSRVWFRORQLDOWKHRU\7KLV
DUJXHV0DGLQD7ORVWDQRYDKDV OHIW D µWKHRUHWLFDO YRLG¶ IRU D FULWLFDO VWXG\ RI
the effects of Communism. The changes occurring post 1989 carried with 
them an expectation that post-commuQLVW VWDWHV ZRXOG µFDWFK XS¶ ZLWK WKHLU
Western neighbours in what was conceptualised as a linear process of progress 
to reach Western modernity (Mayblin, Piekut and Valentine 2014). Following 
0DULD 7RGRURYD¶V  HDUO\ DSSOLFDWLRQ RI 6DLGLDQ &RORQLDOLVm to the 
Balkans, postcolonial theoretical insights found their way into scholarship that 
aimed to critically make sense of the post-communist context VHH'RPDĔVNL
2004, Janion 2006). Although not without critique of being inapplicable to 
Central and Eastern Europe (Snochowska-Gonzales 2012), postcolonial 
insights have more recently been adapted to fit the very specific post-
communist context with the emergence of post-dependence theory (Tlostanova 
2012). Tlostanova proposes post-dependence theory as a way to analyse 
knowledge that grows out of local histories (Tlostanova 2012). We apply this 
perspective to make sense of the Polish mosque conflicts and the growth of 
anti-Muslim prejudice. We stress that not only should scholarship on mosque 
conflicts in Europe include the often neglected outsiders of Western modernity 
- the post-communist geographies - but also that these processes need to be 
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understood within local histories that are influenced by meta-narratives of 
PRGHUQLW\ 8QGHUVWDQGLQJ 3RODQG¶V SRVLWLRn as outside of the ideological 
construct of the West is crucial for an understanding of contemporary politics 
of Othering in the country. Post-dependence theory thus allows for more 
nuanced readings of the emerging Islamophobic trends in Poland because it 
DOORZV WKH µQRW TXLWH (XURSHDQ¶ SHUVSHFWLYH WR EH KHDUG RQ LWV RZQ WHUPV
(Tlostanova 2012:133). It also allows us to tell the story of mosque conflicts 
and emerging Islamophobia in a country like Poland without the need to fit 
into pre-existing moulds shaped by Western European experiences of mosque 
politics. While the religious genealogy of Islam in the West is multifaceted and 
heterogeneous, there are nevertheless stark historical differences between 
Western Europe and CEE that impact on the way that Islam, and 
Islamophobia, manifests itself today.  
This paper is divided into three parts. Our starting point is historical 
and aims to show how Muslims in Poland have gone from being a largely 
accepted community to becoming a suspicious one, opposed by large segments 
of the Polish society. An understanding of the recent escalations of 
Islamophobic sentiments in Poland requires a rooting of the mosque conflicts 
ERWKLQ3RODQG¶VODUJHO\DPLFDEOHDQGORQJVWDQGLQJKLVWRULFDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK
,VODPDQG3RODQG¶VUecent history of Communism and then post-Communism. 
We show how the growth of the Muslim community in the last decades 
changed its character and profile. Here, we focus also on the intricate inter-
group tensions in the diverse Muslim community and their role in the mosque 
conflicts. Secondly, we map the contemporary conflicts over mosques by 
looking at two recent cases of mosque constructions in Warsaw. We attempt to 
unravel the vast array of arguments that used by various mosque opponents. 
Finally, we situate the Warsaw case studies within a broader discussion on 
growing Islamophobia in Poland.  
This paper is based on two main sets of qualitative data. The first, 
conducted by the first author, was part of a year-long doctoral fieldwork 
project in Warsaw, mapping mosque conflicts in Poland. It involved six focus 
groups (N=26) and eleven individual and paired interviews (N=13) with local 
residents, city authorities, anti-mosque activists and Muslims as well as 
participant observations, media and documentary analysis. The second set of 
data was gathered by the second author for a research project focusing on 
Muslim communities in Poland, carried out between 2011 and 2013. This 
consisted of twenty in-depth interviews with representatives of different 
Muslim groups, participant observation, and a Muslim focus group (N=10). 
Additionally, findings are provided from an ongoing project by the second 
author (2014-2016) on religious dimensions of Islamophobia in Poland. This 
involves systematic content analysis of Catholic media in Poland as well as 
interviews with Muslim and anti-Muslim groups in the country.  
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)URPDKRPRJHQRXVµXV¶WRDGLYHUVHµWKHP¶ 
Like in many other parts of Europe the process of Muslim Othering has been 
closely linked to wider socio-political transformations and national as well as 
pan-European identity construction processes (Delanty 1995). In the case of 
Poland, it has in the last decades also been associated with the growing 
diversity of the Muslim community and the inter-group tensions that 
accompanied this diversification. Muslims have been portrayed in the Polish 
historiography in ambiguous ways. While in certain periods and by some 
groups viewed as heroes and guardians of Polish sovereignty and framed 
ZLWKLQ DQ LQFOXVLYH FDWHJRU\ RI µXV¶ DW RWKHU WLPHV DQG E\ RWKHU JURXSV
0XVOLPVZHUHIUDPHGDVµ2WKHUV¶DQGSHUFHLYHGDVLQYDGHUVGHDGO\HQHPLHV
DQGDOLHQV%RUDZVNLDQG'XELĔVNL2YHUDOOWKH7DWDUVZere welcomed 
LQ3RODQGDQGFRQVWLWXWHGSDUWRI FRXQWU\¶VKLVWRU\RI UHOLJLRXVGLYHUVLW\ WKDW
spanned across several centuries (Dziekan 2011).  
Although the very first account of Polish tribes and proto-state 
structures on the Polish historical territories comes from 10
th
 century Arabic 
sources (Hermes 2012), until the end of the 13
th
 century Poles had only 
sporadic contact with Muslims. Permanent Muslim settlements did not appear 
within the Polish-Lithuanian territories until the end of the 14
th
 century. 
Initially these settlements were made up of Tatar prisoners of war and refugees 
in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, at that time a shared monarchy with Poland. 
The first presence of a mosque in the Polish-Lithuanian state was noted in the 
16th century (Chazbijewicz, Bohdanowicz and Tyszkiewicz 1997). 
Polish openness to Muslim and other faith groups was evidenced in the 
early laws on religious freedom. It was mobilised by the liberal rule of the 
-DJLHááR G\QDVW\ DQG PDWHULDOLVHG LQ WKH  :DUVDZ &RQIHGHUDWLRQ a 
pioneering formalisation of religious tolerance law in Europe that secured 
religious freedoms for minority faith communities. At that time, Poland was 
ethnically and religiously diverse with significant groups of Tatars, Jews, 
Armenians, Ukrainians and Germans living side by side with Poles and 
Lithuanians. The Tatars in the united Poland and Lithuania lost their language 
by the end of the 16th century and incorporated some Polish-Lithuanian 
traditions but maintained their religion and customs. A new wave of Tatar 
settlers arrived in present-day northeast Poland at the end of the 17th century 
and continue to live there to this day (Czarniejewska, Kosowicz and Marek 
2009). As the community grew, comprising up to 25,000 people (Sobczak 
1984), mosques were built without opposition as there were no formal 
restraints to the construction of Muslim places of worship (Konopacki 
2010:105). Muslims played a key role in the Polish-Lithuanian defence system 
DQGPRVWVLJQLILFDQWO\ZHUHSDUWRIWKH3ROLVK.LQJ6RELHVNL¶V army during the 
Battle of Vienna in 1683. Thus, one of the important battles with the Ottoman 
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Empire was won in part thanks to the support of Muslim soldiers in the Polish 
army ± a fact that is not consistent with the vision of the Second Siege of 
Vienna as a victory of Christians against Muslims, frequently evoked by 
Polish nationalists and anti-Muslim groups. In contrast to the contemporary 
IUDPLQJ RI 0XVOLP LPPLJUDQWV DV µ2WKHUV¶ 7DWDUV KDYH SUHGRPLQDQWO\
KLVWRULFDOO\EHHQIUDPHGDVµXV¶ 
The societal acceptance of Muslims also translated to an unchallenged 
visibility of Muslim communities. Before Poland disappeared from the maps 
of Europe at the end of the 18
th
 century, there were 23 mosques and five prayer 
KRXVHVZLWKLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VERUGHUV.U\F]\ĔVki 1938). In the Poland that re-
emerged on the maps of Europe after the First World War there were 19 
0XVOLP FRPPXQLWLHV HDFK ZLWK WKHLU PRVTXHV DQG FHPHWHULHV .U\F]\ĔVNL
$IWHU WKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DUDQG3RODQG¶VZHVWZDUGVKLIWRQWKHPDS
of Europe, only about 10% of the traditional Tatar settlements remained within 
the new Polish borders. The post-war migrations further dispersed the Tatar 
FRPPXQLW\ DFURVV WKH FRXQWU\ *UyGĨ 	 1DOERUF]\N  In contrast to 
3RODQG¶VHWKQR-religious composition prior to World War II, when over 30% 
of the population belonged to minorities of Ukrainian, Jewish, Byelorussian 
and German descent, post-war Poland was largely ethnically homogenous. 
With almost 90% of its citizens declaring adherence to the Roman Catholic 
Church, Poland also became one of the most religiously homogenous countries 
in Europe (GUS 2014). In the context of these new socio-cultural realities 
Islam started to experience a slow revival as a result of the processes of 
migration. From the 1970s Muslims immigrated to Poland initially for 
educational purposes (especially from befriended socialist Arab countries), and 
later for economic and political reasons (e.g. refugees from Chechnya) 
3ĊG]LZLDWU2011).  
The collapse of Communism changed the regional patterns of 
migration. Apart from dynamic emigration processes, Poland became 
increasingly attractive to immigrants (among them Muslim professionals and 
refugees). With the arrival of these new groups of Muslims the Tatars have 
gradually lost their status as the representatives of the Polish Muslim 
community, and today the Tatars make up only a small minority (up to 5000) 
within a wider (around 35,000) Muslim community in Poland. The remaining 
majority is a very diverse group that is comprised of former and current 
students, professionals, members of the diplomatic corps, economic migrants, 
refugees (up until now predominantly Chechens) and, importantly, a growing 
number of Poles who have converted to Islam. The community is 
heterogeneous not only in ethnic but also religious terms.  
The growing diversity within the Muslim community in Poland has 
also led to increasing tensions between the various groups of believers. These 
tensions have emerged not only as a result of theological differences between 
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the groups, but also as a consequence of ethno-cultural diversity, differences in 
religious practice, and struggle IRU DXWKRULW\ :DUPLĔVND  3ĊG]LZLDWU
2011). The two major organisations that claim to represent Muslims in Poland 
are 0X]XáPDĔVNL =ZLą]HN 5HOLJLMQ\ or MZR [Muslim Religious Union] and 
/LJD 0X]XáPDĔVND or LM [Muslim League] (3ĊG]LZLDWU ). The MZR, 
founded by a group of Tatars in 1925, has acted as the main representative 
body of the Polish Muslims. The Mufti of Poland is the official head of the 
MZR and is perceived by the state as the primary representative of Muslims in 
Poland. The LM was set up much later ± in 2001 ± by Muslims of more recent 
immigrant origin and gained official state recognition as a religious 
community in 2004. 
 Some of the intricate inter-community tensions became particularly 
visible during the conflicts analysed in this paper when Islam became the 
subject of intense public scrutiny following the announcement of mosque 
construction projects in the Polish capital. In contrast to mosque conflicts in 
the West, an important part of the contestation of the constructions came from 
within the leadership of the Polish Tatar community. The Tatars used this 
opportunity to stress their indigenousness, Europeanness, and sameness with 
other Poles while at the same time implicitly or explicitly pointing to the 
alienness and difference of the more recent Muslim migrants engaged in the 
construction of the mosques. The Ochota mosque construction also sparked 
ZLGHUFLYLOLVDWLRQDODUJXPHQWVVHSDUDWLQJWKH7DWDUVIURPWKHµQHZ¶0XVOLPV
$ IRUPHU 7DWDU ,PDP RI WKH *GDĔVN PRVTXH DUJXHG IRU H[DPSOH WKDW WKH
hijab is a relic from the Middle Ages and should not be adopted by modern 
European Muslims3RVLWLRQLQJKLPVHOIDVGLFKRWRPRXVO\RSSRVHGWRWKHµQRQ-
(XURSHDQ¶ 0XVOLPV DQG VSHDNLQJ DJDLQVW 3ROLVK DFFHSWDQFH RI 0XVOLP
refugees (NaTemat.pl 2015), he emphasised a division in the Polish Muslim 
community between Tatars (considered good, European and civilised 
0XVOLPVDQGWKHµ2WKHU¶0XVOLPVODUJHO\LQFOXGLQJ$UDEV3ROLVKFRQYHUWV
and other non-Tatars).  Such attempts by the Tatars, marked by an ambition 
towards closeness with Western modernity and maintenance of monopoly of 
religious authority, feeds into Islamophobic narratives. As we point out 
towards the end of this paper, the repercussions of heightened anti-Muslim 
sentiments affect all Muslims in Poland, including the Tatars, who are not 
themselves immune to this Othering, despite having contributed to the creation 
of such a narrative. 
 
From unproblematic to increasingly contentious mosques 
The history of mosques in Poland reflects the aforementioned transformations 
of the Muslim community in the country. The historic sources are generally 
silent about any protests against the building of Muslim religious spaces in the 
period of shared monarchy and Polish-/LWKXDQLDQFRPPRQZHDOWK.U\F]\ĔVNL
 8 
1938). The only exception seems to be an incident in Trakai in 1609 when a 
crowd ravaged a local mosque in the religious fervour of the counter-
reformation (Sobczak 1984).  
After Poland regained its independence in 1918, the state ± along with 
the Tatar community ± renovated the majority of the Muslim places of worship 
that were left in what became the new Polish territory. No new mosques were 
built in the inter-war period in spite of plans for such constructions in Vilnius 
and Warsaw. One of the key reasons for this was a lack of resources 
(Nalborczyk 2011). Today, out of the 19
 
pre-war Muslim communities within 
what were then the borders of Poland only two small Polish Tatar villages, 
Kruszyniany and Bohoniki, situated in the eastern border with Belarus, 
continue the Tatar religious and cultural heritage in Poland. Each village is 
home to an historic wooden mosque, still in use. The wooden mosques have 
more in common with the local churches than mosques found across the 
Muslim world, because they were both conceptually influenced and physically 
built by the same carpenters that constructed Catholic and Orthodox churches 
at the time (Nalborczyk 2011). In addition to the mosques in Kruszyniany and 
Bohoniki, a purpose-built mosque was also constructed in the northern city of 
*GDĔVNEHWZHHQDQG,WZDVQRWORFDORSSRVLWLRQWRWKHPRVTXHWKDW
delayed its construction but rather the limited availability of building material 
and funding in the failing Communist economy. In fact, as Nalborczyk (2011) 
writes, the Tatars were helped by non-Muslim neighbours and collaborated 
with the local church to build the mosque. 
Despite being home to approximately 10,000 Muslims, Warsaw did not 
have a single purpose-built mosque prior to 2015. In 1993 a residential home 
in the Polish capital was converted into a prayer space and functioned as the 
main mosque in the capital until 2 ZKHQ :DUVDZ¶V ILUVW SXUSRVH-built 
mosque opened three years later than planned. While the erections of the 
ZRRGHQPRVTXHVLQ%RKRQLNLDQG.UXV]\QLDQ\DQGWKHPRGHUQRQHLQ*GDĔVN
were by and large unproblematic, recent mosque constructions in Poland have 
been vehemently opposed.  
In many European cities where Muslim minorities are significantly 
larger in size, mosques are often located in areas where these minorities 
themselves reside (Naylor and Ryan 2002). In the case of the two mosque 
construction plans in Warsaw, due to the vastly different Muslim landscape in 
WKH FLW\ WKH 2FKRWD DQG :áRFK\ PRVTXH VLWHV DUH ORFDWHG LQ QRQ-Muslim 
majority residential areas. The two districts where mosque constructions were 
planned in 2010 and 2012 are located only a few kilometres apart and 
neighbour each other. While geographically close, the mosque 
neighbourhoods are very different. The Ochota mosque site is located far from 
the residential centre of the neighbourhood, close to a shopping complex, a 
main road and a URXQGDERXW ,Q FRQWUDVW WR WKH 2FKRWD PRVTXH¶V EXVWOLQJ
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ORFDWLRQ WKH :áRFK\ PRVTXH VLWH LV LQ DQ ROG UHVLGHQWLDO QHLJKERXUKRRG
FDOOHGµ6WDUH:áRFK\¶7KHDUHDLVPXFKTXLHWHUDQGSRRUHU than Ochota, with 
local residents taking great pride in its unique Garden City inspired 
architectural style. Differences in the make-up of the two neighbourhoods, 
along with the scale of their gentrification and transformations since the 
collapse of Communism, was also apparent in the way in which the two 
mosque constructions were opposed. While in Ochota - considered one of the 
most attractive parts of the city, ethnically diversifying and visibly gentrifying 
over the past decades - the construction of the mosque did not mobilise large 
groups of local protestors, it did sRLQWKHGLVWULFWRI:áRFK\$VZLOOEHVKRZQ
EHORZWKHIDFWWKDW:áRFK\KDVEHHQRQHRIWKHSRRUHVWSDUWVRIWKHFLW\DQG
particularly negatively affected by the post-Communist economic 
transformations ± for example by relocation to it of families with social 
SUREOHPVIURPRWKHUSDUWVRI WKHFDSLWDO .Xü-Czajkowska 2008) ± had clear 
implication for the case in question. The act of excluding a mosque from the 
:áRFK\ QHLJKERXUKRRG KDV WR WKHUHIRUH EH XQGHUVWRRG WKURXJK WKH SULVP RI
:áRFK\¶VPDUJLQDOLVHGSRVition in the wider context of Warsaw.  
The transition towards democracy generated new insecurities which in 
turn contributed to a scapegoat effect, as Kapralski (2008) has illustrated with 
the example of the Roma population. In a renewed search for easy targets to 
blame, racist stereotypes targeting minority groups flourished in a post-
Communist context where the relatively weak state structures bend easily to 
QDWLRQDOLVW SXEOLF VHQWLPHQWV $W WKH VDPH WLPH VRPH ROG WUDGLWLRQDO µIRON
GHYLOV¶ KDYH EHHQ ORVLQg attractiveness while new ones, especially Muslims, 
DUHFRPLQJWRWKHIRUHVHH3ĊG]LZLDWU  
:DUVDZ¶VILUVWPRVTXHFRQIOLFW2FKRWDFDVHVWXG\ 
In 2010 the Muslim League publicly announced plans for the first purpose-
built mosque in the Polish capital, fuelling an unprecedented national debate 
on Islam. Shortly after the news of the mosque construction burst into the 
public debate, an anti-mosque demonstration was organised. A group called 
(XURSD3U]\V]áRĞFL [Europe of the Future] emerged as the main orchestrators 
of the opposition to the new mosque. The group is headed by three men who 
DUWLFXODWHG WKHLURSSRVLWLRQ LQHORTXHQW WHUPVSURFODLPLQJ µ(XURSHDQYDOXHV¶
RIGHPRFUDF\ VHFXODULVP IUHHGRPRI H[SUHVVLRQDQG LPSRUWDQWO\ZRPHQ¶V
rights: 
We critique Islam from the position of secularism, from the position of women's 
movements, gay movements, human rights, let's call it rational humanism, that 
is our ideal. 
(Male, 30+. Member of Europe of the Future) 
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The group argued that these liberal values were core to the Europe they 
identified with and contradictory to the values of the Muslim League and 
Muslims at large.  
Ahead of the anti-mosque protest in March 2010, Europe of the Future 
plastered Warsaw city centre with posters of a woman in a black niqab, 
standing next minarets that resembled missiles. The posters were almost 
identical to Swiss anti-minaret posters (yet with a Polish flag and a slogan in 
3ROLVK WKDW UHDG µ6WRS WKH UDGLFDO PRVTXH LQ :DUVDZ¶ DJDLQ FRQILUPLQJ D
clear ambition for the Polish anti-mosque group to be read as in line with a 
Western European mobilisation. The image of the veiled woman on the poster 
served a double purpose; on the one hand symbolising a threat in the form of a 
foreign terrorist body (see Puar 2007), and on the other hand reflecting the 
RUJDQLVHUV¶ QHR-colonial ambitions to save Muslim women who they 
expressed concern for, with little acknowledgement of the violence and 
superiority contained in such narratives (Spivak 1988, Abu-Lughod 2002). 
(PSOR\PHQWRI µJHQGHU H[FHSWLRQDOLVP¶ 3XDUKDVEHFRPHDFRPPRQ
form of Islamophobic expression in some Western countries, perhaps most 
prominently discussed in the case of the Netherlands (Bracke 2012, Butler 
2008). While the poster was only temporally glued to the walls RI:DUVDZ¶V
cityscape, liberal arguments borrowed from anti-mosque protests in other 
countries were adopted by anti-Muslim opposition in Poland. As a local 
councillor observed, opposition to the mosque was often expressed within the 
context of a concern foUµWKHWUHDWPHQWRIZRPHQE\0XVOLPV¶LQWHUYLHZZLWK
councillor, Ochota neighbourhood). This was echoed by many of the 
interviewees, thus dehumanising Muslims and further creating a civilizational 
JDSEHWZHHQ0XVOLPVZKRHQEORFWUHDWZRPHQEDGO\DQGµXV¶, who do not:  
The [Muslim] women do not get anything. I think they are treated worse than 
animals. 
(Female, 20+, local resident, Ochota neighbourhood) 
 
It is difficult to think that we might see a mosque built here next door, with 
these people that treat women badly. 
(Male, 20+, local resident, Ochota neighbourhood) 
We argue that such employment of feminist discourses here is not consistent 
with the current Polish context nor the genealogy of its gender politics that 
differs vastly from many Western European contexts, where the formation of 
gender politics has often been intimately entangled within a colonial nation-
state framework and then with the post-1989 multicultural debate (see Bracke 
2012). In Central and Eastern European, throughout times of war and struggle, 
ideal womanhood was intimately linked with sacrifice and martyrdom, an ideal 
represented in the Virgin Mary (Janion 2006). This mechanism is further 
complicated by the ambivalent position of Polish gender politics in the first 
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place. The enforced gender equality of the Communist regime ± with childcare 
SURYLVLRQ OHJDO DERUWLRQ DQG WKH LQFUHDVH RI ZRPHQ¶V HGXFDWLRQ DQG
employment ± was hailed and then lamented by Western feminist circles after 
the fall of Communism (Siklova 1993). Consequently, with assistance from 
post-dependence and post-colonial thinking, we assess calls among our 
participants for the liberation of Muslim women in Poland as symptomatic of a 
Polish ambition for closeness to Western Europe that it never truly gained. In 
the wordV RI 6WXDUW +DOO µ(DVWHUQ (XURSH GRHVQ
W GRHVQ
W \HW" QHYHU GLG"
EHORQJ SURSHUO\ WR WKH :HVW¶ \HW WKH µGHVLUH WR EHFRPH WKH :HVW¶ WDNHV
precedence (see Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006). 
  On the day of the mosque protests in the Ochota neighbourhood, 
around 150 people gathered at the mosque construction site, in what was a 
curious spectacle of unlikely allies. From secular liberals to Polish right-wing 
nationalists, various banners danced in front of the then partially built mosque, 
EHDULQJVORJDQVVXFKDVµ6WRS,VODPLVDWLRQRI(XURSH¶µSharia contradictory to 
GHPRFUDF\¶DQGµ/HW¶VQRWUHSHDWWKHPLVWDNHVRI(XURSH¶1DUNRZLF]
The liberal anti-Muslim group who coordinated the protests hoped to expand 
their base of alliances by pointing to the historic legacy of the mosque 
construction plot and the deceptiveness of the Muslim League (Euroislam 
Facebook Page, 22 February, 2014). According to the local councillor from the 
Ochota neighbourhood mentioned above, the site was the former battleground 
of Polish soldiers fighting against the Russians in the November uprising of 
1831. The proximity of the Ochota mosque site to a place where Polish 
VROGLHUV ZHUH DOOHJHGO\ EXULHG ZDV IRU KLP µLGHQWLFDO¶ WR WKH FRQIOLFW DURXQG
WKH µ*URXQG =HUR¶ PRVTXH LQ 1HZ <RUN OHDGLQJ KLP WR FRQFOXGH WKDW WKH
Polish Muslims had a hidden agenda (interview with councillor). Europe of the 
Future raised accusations about the suspect nature of the Muslim group behind 
the mosque construction, arguing that it had links with the Muslim 
Brotherhood (interview with representative). The group also argued that the 
local councillors were misinformed about the construction in their area 
EHFDXVHµWKHSODQZDVRQO\ WREXLOGDFXltural centre in the neighbourhood ± 
ZLWKRXWDPRVTXH¶*D]HWD:\ERUF]D0DUFK$FFRUGLQJWRRIILFLDO
protocol from a 2010 committee meeting dedicated to construction of the 
Ochota mosque, the authorities gave approval for the construction of a Centre 
for Muslim culture with a prayer space. The description for the construction 
was reminiscent of a similar project in the Italian city of Lodi where the 
SURMHFWZDVGHVFULEHGDVDµFHQWUHIRU,VODPLFFXOWXUH¶ZLWKDµVSHFLDOVSDFHWR
be used as a prayHUURRP¶DQGQRWDµPRVTXH¶6DLQW-Blancat and Schmidt di 
Friedberg 2005:1087). This ostensibly minor difference in description of the 
Warsaw construction was significant in stoking the confusion and resentment 
felt among the Warsaw locals regarding whether the construction was a 
mosque or a cultural centre with a prayer space.  
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If I wanted to build a church with a bell tower I would not write in my project 
proposal that I would build a little house with a little bell, would I? It says a 
Centre of Islamic culture with a prayer space ± there is nothing here that says it 
will be a mosque!  
(Local councillor, Ochota neighbourhood) 
For some Muslims the wording was not as significant. While acknowledging 
the confusion around the definition of the construction, the Muslims 
interviewed did not regard this as unusual. To them, what mattered most was 
to have a space to pray. The current mosque in Warsaw, a converted family 
house, was physically incapable of accommodating the congregation and a 
larger space was required. To them, the narratives of deception fuelled 
strongly by Europe of the Future were exaggerated. A focus group of Muslim 
women challenged the secular public-private divide propounded by the 
protestors, proposing the use of a more flexible definition of what constitutes a 
mosque which reflects that of Islamic tradition (Nasser 2005) and is also a 
more familiar narrative in Poland, where religion is an important part of the 
public sphere: 
Marta: A group of people who tried to force through provocation [were] saying 
that there was an agreement for a Muslim Cultural Centre and not a mosque. 
Dagmara: There will obviously be prayers there and teaching, whether it is 
called an apartment, a centre of dialogue or a mosque. 
$\HVKD)RUXVLWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHU 
(Muslim women, focus group) 
 
The Ochota mosque protests marked a conflict not seen before in the Polish 
public sphere. So when a new mosque project was proposed by an entirely 
different Muslim group a couple years later, a protest engaging the whole local 
neighbourhood erupted. With the involvement of the locals, a shift from liberal 
FRQFHUQVRIZRPHQ¶VULJKWVDQGGHPRFUDF\WRDUJXPHQWVURRWHGPXFKPRUHLQ
a Catholic opposition to a foreign religious threat, sufficed.   
:DUVDZ¶VVHFRQGPRVTXHFRQIOLFW:áRFK\FDVHVWXG\ 
The Ochota protests were still echoing when in 2012 a new mosque conflict 
surfaced only seven kilometres from the Ochota site. This time mosque 
construction plans were put forward by the Ahmadiyya community, a different 
Muslim group that has little in common with the Muslim League that was 
behind the Ochota mosque. The Ahmadiyyas ± a revivalist movement within 
Islam that is by many Muslims not even considered as part of Islam ± started 
their missionary work in Poland before the Second World War and currently 
has a few dozHQ IROORZHUV LQ WKH FRXQWU\ 6WDZLĔVNL7KH$KPDGL\\D
FRPPXQLW\ZDVQRWQHZWR:áRFK\DWWKHWLPHRIWKHLUDSSOLFDWLRQIRUPRVTXH
planning permission. Indeed, they had for several years owned a small piece of 
land in the area with a house on it, prior to the emergence of the idea of 
expanding their current offices and prayer space to build a mosque. Their plan 
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was to erect a mosque that would be only two meters higher than their existing 
building and which would house a bookshop alongside prayer facilities 
(interview with the Ahmadi chief architect).  
5HVLVWDQFH WR WKH $KPDGL\\D PRVTXH LQ :áRFK\ GLIIHUHG WR WKDW LQ
neighbouring Ochota. Firstly, and surprisingly, the main opponents of the 
Ochota mosque ± the liberal (XURSD 3U]\V]áRĞFL ± did not engage in the 
RSSRVLWLRQWR:áRFK\PRVTXH$VWDWHPHQWRQWKHLUZHEVLWHGHFODUHGWKDWWKH\
would not be protesting against the Ahmadiyya mosque because, they argued, 
the Ahmadiyya group was peaceful and not politicised like the other Muslim 
groups in Poland (Euroislam.pl, 11 January 2011). The way that Europa 
3U]\V]áRĞFL distinguished some Muslims from others reflected dichotomous 
ELQDULHVHVWDEOLVKHGEHWZHHQWKHµJRRG¶DQGWKHµEDG¶2WKHUV(Valentine 2010) 
or EHWZHHQµJRRG¶DQGµEDG¶0XVOLPV0DPGDQL'HVSLWHWKHIDFW WKDW
the group was supportive of the Ahmadiyya construction project, there was 
still significant opposition to the mosque initiated by the local councillors 
which attracted considerable local support. To locals, the Ahmadiyyas were no 
different to other Muslims and irritation was caused due to the proximity of the 
two mosques that for them was a sign of the Islamisation of space. The 
opposition here was driven by locals and reflected local and national 
sentiments to a larger extent than in Ochota. The arguments mainly focussed 
on spatial concerns and, albeit to a lesser extent, unveiled religiously-based 
opposition. 
A couple of the local councillors from the conservative PIS [Law and 
Justice] party initiated a petition signed by 500 local residents which 
represented almost the entire neighbourhood. Their arguments focussed on 
spatial aspects, interwoven with cultural and security issues: 
The planned mosque, due to its size, would not fit well into the low-built 
UHVLGHQWLDO QHLJKERXUKRRG« ODFN RI SDUNLQJ VSDFHV DQG PDQ\ YHKLFOHV
on the street would cause it to lose its character as a leisure space with 
ROGWUHHV«WKHPRVTXHFRQVWUXFWLRQPD\ORZHUKRXVHSULFHV«:HDOVR
point to the fact that Islam, irrespective of the religious differences 
between us, is culturally distinct and different, which may lead to 
unwanted and hitherto unknown social prREOHPVLQWKHORFDOLW\:áRFK\
protest letter, 2011). Two of the signatories were a mother and daughter 
ZKRKDGEHHQOLYLQJLQ:áRFK\IRUPDQ\\HDUV'XULQJDQLQWHUYLHZZLWK
them, they insisted that their opposition was necessary in order to 
maintain the character of the neighbourhood. To them, the mosque was 
yet another imposition on the already fast transforming area: 
The urban planning here is very specific. The neighbourhood is called 
5HVLGHQFH:áRFK\VRMXVWWKHZRUGUHVLGHQFHVSHDNVIRULWVHOIULJKW" 
)HPDOHVDQGORFDOUHVLGHQWV:áRFK\QHLJKERXUKRRG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The neighbourhood as imagined by the locals held on to its unique character 
with no more than a few broken bricks. Our fieldwork in the area revealed, 
however, that a huge construction site for a new apartment complex had been 
erected less than 500 metres from where the mosque plot was situated. The 
apartments were to be several stories high, with a tall clock tower in the centre. 
While the clock tower and the minaret were not considered equally out of 
SODFH WKH UHFHQW GHYHORSPHQWV LQ :áRFK\ ZHUH QRW QHFHVVDULO\ ZHOFRPH
interventions either:  
We got the airpRUWZHJRWWKHDQLPDOVKHOWHUDQGWKHWUXFNVSDVVLQJWKURXJK«
HYHU\WKLQJLVEURXJKWRQWKH:áRFK\QHLJKERXUKRRG 
)HPDOHVDQGORFDOUHVLGHQWV:áRFK\QHLJKERXUKRRG 
7KH:áRFK\RSSRVLWLRQZLWKLWVIRFXVRQWKH1,0%<HVTXHVHQWLPHQWVRIWKH
erosion of the character of the locality and its greenery, reflected familiar 
arguments against mosque constructions across Europe (Allievi 2010) and 
beyond (Dunn 2001). As such, the issues of spatial planning dominating the 
YLJRURXV RSSRVLWLRQ LQ :áRFK\ DFWHG SDrtly as subtext to deeper 
neighbourhood tensions and were a way to restore something that was long 
gone amidst new and unwanted developments. The concerns of the local 
residents were imbued with nostalgia, attachment, and a need to block what 
was viewed as QHJDWLYHGHYHORSPHQWVE\WKHFLW\DXWKRULWLHV.Xü-Czajkowska 
2008) - making :áRFK\ LQWR D µVRFLDO GXPSLQJ JURXQG¶. Entangled in these 
arguments, moreover, was a religiously-rooted opposition ± elaborated on 
below ± which drew clear inspirations from the idea of Poland as a bulwark of 
Christianity and the force capable of re-Christianising Europe. 
:HDUHQRWDJDLQVWWKHPIRUZKRWKH\DUH%XWOHW¶VQRWH[DJJHUDWHEHFDXVHDV,VD\
soon... if you let them once, second time and third time and then a tenth time then 
WKHUHZLOOEHPRUHPRVTXHVEHFDXVHDFLW\ZRQ¶WILQGWKHEDVLVWRUHMHFWWKHPDQG
there will be more of them than of our Catholic churches!  
 )HPDOHVDQGORFDOUHVLGHQWV:áRFK\QHLJKERXUKRRG 
3ODQV IRU WKH$KPDGL\\DPRVTXH LQ:áRFK\ZHre eventually rejected by the 
local council in the spring of 2013. An extract of the letter motivating the 
decision to reject the mosque construction project read: 
7KHORFDOUHVLGHQWVLQ:áRFK\DUHVLPSO\FRQFHUQHGDERXWPDLQWDLQLQJWKHFDOP
and the character of the area. The construction of a culturally foreign object is a 
UHDVRQIRUFRQFHUQUHJDUGLQJWKHORVVRIYDOXHRIWKHHVWDWHVLQ:áRFK\ 
5HMHFWLRQ/HWWHU:áRFK\FRXQFLO$SULO 
Arguments about spatial planning and parking spaces functioned on the one 
hand as general expression of the resistance to change in the neighbourhood 
DQG RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG DV VXEWH[W WR GHHSHU UHVHQWPHQW WRZDUGV µFXOWXUDOO\
IRUHLJQ¶ DQG UHOLJLRXVO\ 2WKHU Muslims, evidenced in the rejection letter 
above.  
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The aftermath of mosque conflicts  
After years of conflict around mosque construction in the capital, only one of 
the two planned constructions went ahead and eventually opened its doors 
VKRUWO\EHIRUH5DPDGDQLQ7KHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI:DUVDZ¶VILUVWSXUSRVH-
built mosque, located in Ochota neighbourhood, marks a significant turning 
point in the long history of Polish Islam. The mosque, which also serves as a 
cultural centre, brings recognition to the Muslim community as was evidenced 
E\ WKH µ1RF ĝZLąW\Ĕ¶ >1LJKW RI WKH 7HPSOHV@ LQ 6HSWHPEHr 2015, when the 
newly constructed mosque saw more than 1000 non-Muslim YLVLWRUV ĩ\FLH
Warszawy, September 15, 2015). Yet since the beginning of its construction, 
the Ochota mosque has also been a target of hostilities. During construction, it 
was shot at by a person using a pneumatic firing weapon; not long after its 
RIILFLDO RSHQLQJ LQ  D ZRPDQ WKUHZ D SLJ¶V KHDG LQVLGH WKH EXLOGLQJ
,QWHUYLHZZLWKWKHPRVTXH¶VLPDP 
What started as protests against one mosque construction, quickly 
transformed into an unprecedented surge in attacks on mosques across Poland 
LQ WKH FLWLHV RI *GDĔVN 3R]QDĔ DQG %LDá\VWRN <HW SHUKDSV WKH PRVW
devastating - not in scale but in symbolism ± was the 2014 attack on the 17th 
century Tatar mosque in Kruszyniany. A pig was drawn on the outside wall of 
the green wooden mosque and abusive graffiti was sprayed on the graves of 
the adjacent Muslim cemetery. The Tatars, having lived in Poland for several 
hundred years without experiencing hostility, were deeply affected by this 
unprecedented rise in Islamophobic attacks. This incident showed that, in the 
context of an unprecedented rise in Islamophobia, all Muslims are targeted 
through attacks on their places of worship, whether they have lived in Poland 
for centuries or just a few years. As such, the inter-group conflicts between 
Muslims that were discussed earlier can potentially contribute to ± rather than 
challenge ± anti-Muslim prejudice targeted towards all communities.  
The transition of the ways that mosques are perceived in Poland, from 
being largely accepted to becoming opposed, should be understood in light of 
wider geopolitical processes. On the one hand, the collapse of Communism 
opened the way for Poles to participate in the life of the international 
community more fully, while on the other hand bringing concomitant fears and 
anxieties. The weakening of historic Polish-Jewish antagonisms led to a search 
for the new Other. In spite of the long Muslim presence in the country, such a 
new enemy was found in the form of the broadly conceived figure of a Muslim 
2WKHU7KHFRQFHSWRIWKHµFODVKRIFLYLOLVDWLRQV¶+XQWLQJWRQIUHTXHQWO\
mentioned by our interviewees from diverse backgrounds was applied to make 
sense of the deaths of Polish soldiers during the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan ± DVSDUWRIWKHµ:DURQ7HUURU¶± and various terrorist attacks, in 
addition to being cited in conjunction with the recent rise of the so called 
Islamic State. While these are some of the factors that have solidified the 
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belief that many 3ROHVKROGRIµWKH0XVOLPWKUHDW¶WKHLPSDFWRIWKHµ:DURQ
7HUURU¶RQ3ROLVKVRFLHW\GRHVQRW WHOO WKHZKROHVWRU\RIWKHJUDGXDOVKLIW LQ
the Polish imagination from a considerable openness towards its Muslim 
minorities to increasing hostility, and the emergence of Poland as one of 
(XURSH¶VPRVWDQWL-0XVOLPFRXQWULHV3ĊG]LZLDWUD5HVHDUFKIURP
UHYHDOHGWKDWRI3ROHVEHOLHYHGWKDWµWRRPDQ\0XVOLPVOLYHLQ3RODQG¶
Among the eight nations involved in the research, Poles were the most critical 
towards Islam. Nearly 62% of the Polish respondents agreed with the thesis 
WKDWµ,VODPLVDQLQWROHUDQWUHOLJLRQ¶DQGRQO\RQHLQILYHEHOLHYHGWKDW0XVOLP
culture could adapt to life in a European/Polish society (Zick 2011). Even if 
the aforementioned statistics need to be understood in light of different 
contexts of public expressions of prejudice (Piekut, Vieten and Valentine 
2014), the findings of various national studies (see CBOS 2012, CBOS 2015a, 
CBOS 2015b) confirm an unprecedented level of anti-Muslim prejudice 
expressed in Poland. To take one example: Arab people, who most often are 
LGHQWLILHGZLWK0XVOLPVLQ3RODQGDQGFDWHJRULVHGDVDµQDWLRQDOJURXS¶LQWKH
studies carried out by the Centre for Public Opinion Research, consistently 
emerged as the most disliked groups, alongside the Roma (CBOS 2012). 
While outside the scope of this paper, it is critical not to ignore that 
Poles are no strangers to the Othering of racialised groups of which the long 
period of Polish anti-Semitism that continued well after the Second World War 
is an obvious case in point (Bilewicz & Krzeminski 2010). While we are 
arguing that Islamophobia, particularly expressed through mosque conflicts, is 
a recent and unprecedented phenomenon, we also stress that it is critical to 
understand Polish Islamophobia within broader processes of racialisation in 
the country. As such it requires an engagement with Polish anti-Semitism and 
recognition that there is a continuity of hostility expressed towards racialised 
groups in Poland. In the national collective memory, Poles predominantly see 
themselves as being the heroes who largely helped Jews during the Second 
World War rather than those who also sometimes participated in their 
oppression (CBOS 2015b). Yet hostility towards Jews and Jewishness still 
exists in Poland, even if according to recent statistics Jews are much more 
liked and accepted than two decades ago (they score higher in polls conducted 
in Poland than the most disliked groups, which are Russians, Turks, Roma and 
Arabs) (CBOS 2012). As such, the eruption of Islamophobic attitudes in 
Poland can be understood as part of a continuous trajectory of Othering and its 
alignment with racism (Meer 2013).  
One of the important players in this process of Othering is the Catholic 
Church. After the collapse of Communism, to which it significantly 
contributed, the Church emerged as a highly trusted institution and was widely 
attended. More recently however, the popularity and influence of the Church 
KDVEHHQGHFOLQLQJ3ĊG]LZLDWUE. 
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While in the West the religious dimension of Islamophobia has been 
frequently linked with concerns about the public manifestation of faith by 
European Muslims (Asad 2003), in the context of Poland it has been above all 
connected with the idea of the re-Christianisation of Europe by a Catholic 
3RODQG 3RODQG¶V FRQYLFWLRQ RI LWV NH\ UROH LQ D QHZ &KULVWLDQLVDWLRQ SURMHFW
derives from the concept of Poland as the bulwark of Christianity [Polonia 
Antemurale Christianitatis]. This is also based on a vision of Europe in which 
the processes of secularisation has lead less to the social space being 
increasingly liberated from the control of the sacred (Church), than to the 
opening of new spaces for the religious expansion of Islam. As such, anti-
Muslim sentiments that derive from this particular Catholic position further set 
aside Polish Islamophobia from what has been observed in Western contexts 
(see Cesari 2005). 
Religious Islamophobic attitudes are nested in various institutional, 
grassroots, and media outlets. Right-wing publications playing an important 
role in the Catholic media landscape (e.g. Polonia Christiana and Fronda) 
actively promote essentialist and nationalist anti-Muslim rhetoric. Tellingly, in 
an article about the opening of the Ochota mosque in the Catholic weekly 
(*RĞü Niedzielny 8 June, 2015), the author argues that the spiritual void 
produced by the processes of secularization is being filled by Islam. Another 
article on the mosque construction project published in the second major 
Catholic weekly explicitly accuses the group behind the mosque project of 
links with terrorism and jihadism (Niedziela, 21
st
 issue, 2010). In this vision 
Poland as a country spared from dynamic secularisation processes is destined 
to defend Christianity and the religious foundations of Europe. Othering of 
Muslims and Islam is used to galvanize the faithful around common 
µ&KULVWLDQ¶SULQFLSOHVDQGZLWKWKHJRDORIVWRSSLQJWKHVXSSRVHGµFRQTXHVWRI
(XURSHDQG3RODQG¶E\,VODP 
Conclusion 
European scholarship on mosques has typically been concerned with Western 
Europe, where the growing Muslim populations have increasingly wanted to 
build houses of worship ± DWUHQGWKDWµORFDO¶SRSXODWLRQVKDYHRIWHQREMHFWHG
to. Despite the fact that Central and Eastern Europe is home to a significantly 
smaller Muslim population than Western Europe, mosque constructions in 
Central and Eastern Europe have also recently become contentious and are 
causing fractions both in the wider society as well as within the increasingly 
heterogeneous Muslim communities resident in the region. Yet academic 
inquiry into these spaces is still scarce.  
By focusing here on two recent mosque construction conflicts in 
Warsaw, we hope to begin to fill the identified gap. As demonstrated by the 
way in which opposition to the Polish mosques was mobilised, one may 
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presume that much of the discourse that surrounds mosques corresponds to 
narratives from Western European countries where mosque conflicts have 
occupied the public sphere longer (see McLoughlin 2005). With Poland 
recently entering into more divisive politics around mosques, some might 
conclude that Polish mosque conflicts will follow a similar trajectory to those 
previously observed in Western European countries. Such a reading risks 
reproducing problematic assumptions conceptualising these processes in linear 
ways and ignores the very different realities for Muslims in countries such as 
Poland where Muslims were not primary (ex)colonial subjects and had 
different class positions; from the Tatars who were highly regarded in the 
Polish army to the students from befriended socialist Arab countries during 
Communism. Therefore, we argue that in the study of post-Communist 
countries it is helpful to apply a post-dependence lens that draws from post-
colonial theory. Post-dependence theory assumes the local specificity as a 
starting point and actively resists surrendering to a temporal trajectory that 
constructs Western European modernity as a model for its outsiders to follow. 
With the assistance of post-dependence theory, the phenomenon of mosque 
conflicts in a post-Communist setting can be better understood.  
By taking an historical starting point, we understand the mosque 
conflicts as being a new phenomenon that is in contrast to the historically 
largely unopposed Islamic presence in Poland. Islam is not a new phenomenon 
in Poland, and the history of the Polish Muslim community has not followed a 
similar path to Muslim communities in Western European countries. As such, 
in contrast WR-RFHO\Q&HVDUL¶VDUJXPHQWWKDW,VODPJRHVIURPLQYLVLEOH
to later becoming visible and then unwanted, in the Polish case Islam was 
indeed both visible and largely welcomed, and has only recently become more 
diverse and increasingly contentious, with mosques being ideologically as well 
as physically opposed. The second notion that post-dependence and post-
colonial thinking allows us to engage with more critically, is the ease with 
ZKLFK RXU LQWHUYLHZHHV DSSOLHG µJHQGHU H[FHSWLRQDOLVP¶ WKURXJK LGHQWifying 
themselves with a largely imagined gender equal national community ± 
Western Europe ± in order to be able to mark Islam and Muslims of 
discrimination of women. Thirdly, as we have shown, in contrast to the West, 
Polish anti-Muslim sentiments have an important religious dimension and are 
XVHGWRJDOYDQL]HWKHIDLWKIXODURXQGFRPPRQ³&KULVWLDQ´SULQFLSOHVLQRUGHU
WR SUHYHQW ³,VODPLVDWLRQ RI 3RODQG DQG (XURSH´ Understanding these 
complexities is critical in countering growing Islamophobia and opening up 
possibilities to challenge the worrying historical discontinuity of positive 
inter-faith relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Poland and the 
wider region. 
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